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Statement of Appellate Jurisdiction 
This Court has ordered review of a court of appeals decision dated May 15, 2008. 
A timely petition for certiorari was filed on June 16, 2008. See Utah R. App. P. 22(a), 
48(a). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(a), (5). 
Statement of the Issues 
This Court granted certiorari to review the following issues, repeated here 
verbatim from the Court's order of August 27, 2008: 
1. Whether the court of appeals erred in construing the scope of the Revised 
Limited Liability Company Act in relation to its affirmance of a verdict for repudiation of 
a limited liability company agreement. 
2. Whether the court of appeals erred in its review of the district court's 
adjudication of claims and defenses presented below. 
3. Whether the court of appeals and district court misapprehended the 
appropriate roles of judge and jury in adjudicating the claims and defenses presented 
below. 
These issues will each be addressed in context in the course of the brief. 
Statement of Standards of Review 
1. The proper interpretation and scope of the Utah Revised Limited Liability 
Company Act present questions of law, which this Court reviews for correctness with no 
deference given to the lower court's determinations. See Duke v. Graham, 2007 UT 31, 
H 7, 158 P.3d 540 (holding LLC Act's statutory interpretation "involve[s] conclusions of 
law that we review for correctness"). 
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2. The proper outcome of legal motions is reviewed for correctness with no 
deference given to any conclusion of law reached below. See Parduhn v Bennett, 2002 
UT 93, 1^ 5, 61 P.3d 982 (summary judgment review); Merino v. Albertsons, Inc., 1999 
UT 14,11 3, 975 P.2d 467 (directed verdict motion); Gold Standard, Inc. v. Getty Oil Co., 
91 5 P.2d 1060, 1066 (Utah 1996) (judgment notwithstanding the verdict). The evidence 
and all reasonable inferences are reviewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving 
party. See, e.g., Mahmoodv. Ross, 1999 UT 104, ^ 16, 990 P.2d 933. Incorrect jury 
instructions result in reversal when a reasonable likelihood exists that the outcome of the 
proceeding was affected. See Cheves v. Williams, 1999 UT 86, ^ 20, 993 P.2d 191. 
3. Where the respective roles of judge and jury were defined on the record, the 
lower courts' proper apprehension of the same is reviewed for correctness. See, e.g., 
Kenny v. Rich, 2008 UT App 209, U 21, 186 P.3d 989 (holding that district court's 
designation of jury as advisory was reviewed for correctness). The district judge's 
discretionary determinations in setting procedure are reviewed for abuse of discretion. 
See id. Underlying legal determinations are reviewed for correctness. See State v. Loose, 
2000 UT 11,^8, 994 P.2d 1237. 
Statement of Preservation Below 
Each of the issues presented was raised and preserved in the court of appeals and 
in the district court. (Ct. App. Aplt. Br. at 1, 19-49; Ct. App. Aplt. Reply Br. at 3-26; R. 
38-66, 117-27, 158-65, 272-305, 323-32, 367-89, 484-502, 524-36, 608-70, 882-97, 899-
901,919-36,997-1000, 1032-1100, 1104-72, 1175, 1189-1207, 1210-12, 1247-1384, 
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1410-13, 1419-93, 1504-16, 1524-29, 1546-48, 1554-61, 1611-13, 1632-37, 1686-1792, 
1871-1957, 1983-84, 1999-2000, 2007-32.) 
Controlling Statutory Provisions 
The parties agree that the relevant statute is the Utah Revised Limited Liability 
Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 48-2c-101 to -1902 (2001). (Cert. Petition at 2; Cert. Opp. at 1; 
Ct. App. Aplt. Br. at 3; Ct. App. Aplee. Br. at 3.) The provisions of the Act are included 
as part of the separately bound addendum, pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(6) & (11). 
Two definitional sections from the Act are important in this appeal: 
48-2c-102(16). Definitions [Operating agreement]. 
"Operating agreement" means any written agreement of the members 
concerning the business or purpose of the company and the conduct of its affairs, 
and which complies with Part 5 [of the Act, governing such agreements]. An 
operating agreement includes any written amendments agreed to by all members 
or other writing adopted in any other manner as may be provided in the operating 
agreement. 
48-2c-102(3). Definitions [Capital account]. 
"Capital account," unless otherwise provided in the operating agreement, 
means the account, as adjusted from time to time, maintained by the company for 
each member to reflect the value of all contributions by that member, the amount 
of all distributions to that member or the member's assignee, the member's share 
of profits, gains, and losses of the company, and the member's share of the net 
assets of the company upon dissolution and winding up that are distributable to the 
member or the member's assignee. 
In addition to these definitions, several key provisions of the Act are at issue in 
this appeal, which will be discussed in context in the Argument. Chief among them are 
the substantive provisions related to LLC capital accounts, allocation of profits and 
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losses, distributions, dissolution, and winding up, which are set out here for the Court's 
convenience when considering the Argument: 
48-2c-903. Capital accounts. 
(1) A capital account shall be maintained for each member. The 
capital account of each member represents that member's share of the net 
assets of the company. Except as otherwise provided in the articles of 
organization or operation agreement, the capital accounts of all members 
shall be adjusted, either increased or decreased, to reflect the revaluation of 
company assets, including intangible assets such as goodwill, on the 
company's books in connection with any of the following events: 
(a) a capital contribution, other than a de minimis 
contribution, made by or on behalf of a new member or an additional 
capital contribution, other than a de minimis contribution, made by 
or on behalf of an existing member; 
(b) a distribution, other than a de minimis amount, made 
in partial or complete redemption of a member's interest in the 
company; or 
(c) the dissolution and winding up of the company. 
(2) Upon any such revaluation event, the book value of company 
assets shall be adjusted to fair market value and unrealized income, gain, 
loss, or deduction inherent in such company assets that have not been 
previously reflected in the members' capital accounts shall be allocated to 
the members' capital accounts. 
48-2c-906. Allocation of profits and losses. 
The profits and losses of a company shall be allocated among the 
members in the manner provided in the operating agreement. If the 
operating agreement does not otherwise provide, profits and losses shall be 
allocated in proportion to the members' capital account balances as of the 
beginning of the company's current fiscal year. 
48-2c-1003. Timing of distributions. 
Distributions to members shall be made at the times or upon the 
happening of the events specified in the operating agreement. If the 
operating agreement does not otherwise provide, each current distribution 
shall be made to all members concurrently, or at other times determined by 
the members in a member-managed company, or by the managers in a 
manager-managed company. 
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48-2c-1003. Liquidating distributions. 
Distributions to the members in connection with the dissolution and 
winding up of a company shall be made in accordance with Section 48-2c-
1308. 
48-2c-120L Events of dissolution. 
A company organized under this chapter shall be dissolved upon the 
occurrence of any of the following events: 
(7) upon entry of a decree of judicial dissolution under 
Section 48-2c-1213. 
48-2c-1203. Effect of dissolution. 
(1) A dissolved company continues its existence but may not 
carry on any business or activities except as appropriate to wind up and 
liquidate its business and affairs, as provided in Part 13 of this chapter. 
(2) Dissolution of a company does not: 
(a) transfer title to the company's property; 
(b) prevent transfer of an interest in the company; 
(c) subject its members or managers to standards of 
conduct different from those prescribed in Part 8; 
(d) change: 
(i) limited liability provided under Part 6 of this 
chapter; 
(ii) voting requirements for its members or 
managers; 
(iii) provisions for selection, resignation, or removal 
of its managers; or 
(iv) provisions for amending its articles of 
organization or operating agreement; 
(e) prevent commencement of a proceeding by or against 
the company in its company name; 
(f) abate or suspend a proceeding pending by or against 
the company on the effective date of dissolution; or 
(g) terminate the authority of the registered agent of the 
company. 
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48-2e-1210. Grounds for judicial dissolution. 
(2) A company may be dissolved in a proceeding filed by any 
member if it is established that: 
(a) the managers are deadlocked in management of 
company affairs and the members are unable to break the deadlock, 
irreparable injury to the company is threatened or being suffered, or 
the business and affairs of the company can no longer be conducted 
to the advantage of the members generally, because of the deadlock; 
(b) the managers or those in control of the company have 
acted, are acting, or will act in a manner that is illegal, oppressive, or 
fraudulent; 
(c) the members are deadlocked in voting power and the 
deadlock has continued for a period of at least six months; 
(d) the company assets are being misapplied or wasted; or 
(e) it is not reasonably practical to carry on the business of 
the company in conformity with its articles of organization and 
operating agreement. 
48- 2c-1213. Decree of dissolution. 
(1) If after a hearing the court determines that one or more 
grounds for judicial dissolution described in Section 48-2c-1210 exist, ii 
may enter a decree dissolving the company and specifying the effective 
date of the dissolution. The clerk of the court shall deliver a certified copy 
of the decree to the division for filing and shall mail a copy of the decree to 
the registered agent of the company or to the division if it has no registered 
agent of record. 
(2) After entering the decree of dissolution, the court shall direct 
the winding up and liquidation of the company's business and affairs in 
accordance with Part 13. 
(3) The court's order may be appealed as in other civil 
proceedings. 
48-2c-1301. Winding up defined. 
The winding up of a dissolved company is the process consisting of 
collecting all amounts owed to the company, selling or otherwise disposing 
of the company's assets and property, paying or discharging the taxes, 
debts and liabilities of the company or making provision for the payment or 
discharge, and distributing all remaining company assets and property 
among the members of the company according to their interests. There is 
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no fixed time period for completion of winding up a dissolved company 
except that the winding up should be completed within a reasonable time 
under the circumstances. 
48-2c-1308. Distribution of assets on winding up. 
(1) After dissolution, and during winding up, the assets of the 
company shall be applied to pay or satisfy: 
(a) first, the liabilities to creditors other than members, in 
the order of priority as provided by law; 
(b) second, the liabilities to members in their capacities as 
creditors, in the order of priority as provided by law; and 
(c) third, the expenses and cost of winding up. 
(2) Company assets remaining after application under Subsection 
(1) shall be allocated and distributed to the members as provided in the 
articles of organization or operating agreement, or if not so provided, in 
accordance with the members' final capital account balances after 
allocation of all profits and losses including profits and losses accrued or 
incurred during winding up. 
Statement of the Case 
This appeal queries whether the provisions of the Utah Revised Limited Liability 
Company Act ("Act," "Revised Act," or "LLC Act") provide the rule of decision in a 
dispute between LLC members relating to their LLC. If the answer is yes, then the case 
should be reversed and remanded with instructions to apply the Act correctly in this case. 
If the answer is no, then the appeal further queries whether the common law was properly 
applied to this dispute. 
In particular, the Court is called upon to determine the viability of an extra-
statutory "LLC repudiation" cause of action adopted by the court of appeals. If any such 
repudiation claim was adopted or adjudicated improperly on this record, then this Court 
should reverse and remand with instructions to correct the error. In resolving these 
issues, the Court should give guidance to the lower courts and to litigants and their 
counsel on the proper rules of decision and procedure to apply in Utah LLC disputes. 
Course of Proceedings aod Disposition Below 
The entity at the heart of this dispute is OLP, L.L.C. ("OLP" or "the LLC"), a 
Utah limited liability company managed by its members. (Ex. 68.) Wayne Burningham 
and Richard Wilson are its only members. (Ex. 68.) 
District Court Proceedings 
On July 25, 2001, Wilson sued Bumingham for relief related to OLP. (R. 1, 3, 25, 
32-37.) Wilson alleged the ongoing existence of the LLC, which he named as a plaintiff. 
(R. 1, 17, 225, 428.) He sought, inter alia, "an order adjudging, declaring and decreeing 
that he is entitled to a full accounting of the expenses, revenues, profits and losses of the 
LLC." (R. 15-17, 224, 427.) He also pleaded contract and fiduciary duty claims against 
Burningham and his sole corporation, Optical Lens Products Management, Inc., d/b/a 
Intermountain Antireflective Coatings ("IARC," pronounced "eye-arc"). (R. 18-22.) 
Wilson's second claim for relief alleged common law anticipatory repudiation. (R. 18.) 
Burningham and IARC answered and counterclaimed on August 31, 2001. (R. 
38.) Burningham acknowledged the ongoing existence of OLP. (R. 39, 42.) He alleged 
that in the absence of a defining operating agreement, the LLC members' capital accounts 
determined the members' respective rights. (R. 56, 59-60, 294-95, 501.) He sought 
judicial dissolution of OLP, a decree winding it up and distributing assets to its members 
per their capital accounts, and other determinations under the LLC Act. (R. 58-60, 63, 
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293-95, 501.) Burningham and 1ARC also advanced counterclaims and sought equitable 
relief. (R. 60-65.) 
Burningham subsequently moved for partial summary judgment seeking a decree 
of judicial dissolution of OLP under Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-1210(2) to "enable the LLC 
to wind up its affairs, pay off its debts, and account for and distribute its remaining 
assets.55 (R. 123, 117-23, 158-65, 608-27.) Burningham argued based on the record 
evidence that the LLC should be dissolved as of August 31, 2001. (R. 623-24.) He asked 
that upon dissolution the court take the statutory steps prescribed in the LLC Act for 
winding up the LLC and making appropriate distributions to its members. (R. 625.) He 
argued that all such distributions should be undertaken in accordance with the LLC 
members' capital account balances as provided in Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-1308. (R. 
528, 625.) Burningham further moved to limit all damage issues to an LLC accounting 
and to strike the jury or clarify jury issues. (R. 524-32, 669-70, 882-87.) 
Wilson opposed these motions. (R. 159, 171-87, 696-722, 1918, 2017 at 33.) He 
argued that the provisions of the LLC Act did not limit him in seeking common law 
damages in a jury trial. (R. 696-701, 718-19, 2017 at 33-34.) In support, he argued that 
the analogous rule of decision in the partnership cases of Gherman v. Colburn, 140 Cal. 
Rptr. 330 (Cal. App. 1977), and Jeaness v. Besnilian, 706 P.2d 143 (Nev. 1985), allowed 
common law damages despite dissolution. (R. 700.) 
Gherman and Jeaness allowed post-dissolution damages when the partnership had 
been "wrongfully dissolved." See Wanlass v. D Land Title, 790 P.2d 568, 572 (Utah 
App. 1990). A necessary element of wrongful dissolution was that a partner "repudiate" 
the partnership. See Gherman, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 343. Gherman held that partnership 
"repudiation" in this context occurs when a partner denies "the very existence of a 
partnership or joint venture relationship in any form or at any time." Id. Burningham 
maintained below that, as a matter of law, Wilson could not meet the criteria of a 
Gherman/Jeaness wrongful dissolution because there had never been a denial by either 
member of the existence of their LLC relationship. (R. 1206.) 
Burningham's LLC motions came before the court for decision following a 
lengthy discovery period. (R. 159, 168-70, 205, 267-71, 450-51, 473-74, 1918, 2014 at 
3-6, 2015 at 17, 2016, 2017 at 33.) The district court observed it was "undisputed that 
this [LLC] is broken and should be dissolved." (R. 2016 at 2.) Nevertheless, the court 
denied Burningham's motions without prejudice. (R. 1023, 2016 at 30.) The court then 
ordered the legal case to proceed before a jury, with equitable claims reserved for the 
court thereafter. (R. 1023, 2016 at 43, 2017-28.) The terms "equity" and "equitable 
claims" wrere used by the district court and the parties to refer to those claims reserved for 
decision by the court, including LLC determinations governed by statute. (R.1583; Ct. 
App. Aplee. Br. at 21, 38; Ct. App. Aplt. Reply Br. at 17 n.8.) 
During trial, Burningham renewed his dissolution motion as a directed verdict 
request. (R. 1203-07, 2024 at 978-81, 989-90.) 
[BURNINGHAM5S COUNSEL]:...[W]e would renew our Motion for 
Summary Judgment that we brought before trial that the Court determine as a 
matter of law that the LLC is dissolved. The evidence as presented by the plaintiff 
in this case is undisputed that by August 31, 2001 when Mr. Burningham's 
petition for judicial dissolution was filed that the conditions for judicial dissolution 
had been shown. . . . 
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THE COURT: As [of] which date, the date of filing? 
[BURNINGHAM'S COUNSEL]: Correct, August 31st, 2001 which was 
the date that Mr. Burningham came into this court and petitioned the court to 
intervene judicially and to oversee the dissolution windup. 
(R. 2024 at 978-79.) At this point, the court granted the dissolution motion. (R. 2024 at 
988-89, 2026 at 1247-49 & 1282.) The court ruled: 
[THE COURT]: For the record, I am determining and I think it's time to do so that 
a dissolution occurred - and I already went through the statutory basis and the 
facts under 48-2C-1210-2 [the judicial dissolution provisions of the LLC Act], a 
dissolution did occur no later than August 31, 2001 and that is the date we'll use. 
(R. 2026 at 1282; see alsoK. 2026 at 1247-82.) 
The court simultaneously ruled that the jury could find damages after the date of 
dissolution if the jury found a "wrongful dissolution" of the LLC. (R. 2026 at 1282.) 
The district court instructed the jury to find wrongful dissolution if it first found 
"Burningham repudiated his agreement with Wilson regarding the operation of the LLC." 
(R. 1145.) The court would not, however, give an instruction that "repudiation" in the 
wrongful dissolution context called for the partner or member to deny the existence of the 
relationship. (R. 1095.) Instead, the court defined the required repudiation as follows: 
A party repudiates a contract when that party does or says anything indicating that 
it does not intend to perform the contract. Repudiation is not the mere breach of 
the contract, or some of its terms. 
(R. 1145-46.) Burningham objected to the giving of this instruction. (R. 2028 at 1547.) 
Wilson's contention in the case was that he and Burningham had entered into an 
oral agreement to share LLC profits equally, which should be enforced according to its 
terms. (R. 6, 2026 at 1327.) Burningham's contention was that, in the absence of a 
written operating agreement, LLC profits were calculated according to the members' 
respective capital accounts under the LLC Act. (R. 42, 59-60, 2026 at 1327.) In 
response to Wilson's arguments that Burningham's contributions to the LLC were 
"loans" from IARC, the court instructed the jury that capital contributions could be made 
by or on behalf of a member. (R. 1157; 2026 at 1319-32.) The court also instructed the 
jury that a loan was not a capital contribution. (R. 1157.) 
In arguing his contentions to the district court, Burningham asked that the jurors 
be instructed on calculating LLC capital accounts under the Revised Act so that they 
could properly measure the conduct of the parties and their agents and consider the 
parties' interests. (R. 2026 at 1319-32.) Following discussion, the court and counsel 
jointly concluded that the capital accounts determination would be for the district judge 
to make following the close of the jury trial. (R. 2026 at 1329-30.) The court observed: 
"1 don't think you can start going through the statute as a formula when that's not really 
what you're asking them [the jury] to do and that's reserved for the Court." (R. 2026 at 
1329.) The court ruled that to instruct the jury on calculating capital accounts would be 
"taking away what you both agreed is going to be the Court's function." (R. 2026 at 
1330.) Accordingly, no instruction was given to the jury on calculating LLC members' 
capital accounts and no capital accounts determination was given to the jury. (R. 1084, 
1104-08, 2026 at 1330, 2028 at 1628.) 
The district court ruled instead that it would conduct post-trial proceedings to 
determine the members' LLC capital accounts, address Burningham's equitable claims 
and defenses, and conduct an LLC accounting and winding up. (R. 1023, 1158, 2025 at 
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1176, 2026 at 1319-30, 2028 at 1507-11 & 1530.) The court told the parties that they 
need not put on all their evidence at the jury trial. (R. 2016 at 43-44.) The court ruled 
that the jury's determinations on the parties' respective interests in OLP, made without 
the benefit of all the LLC Act's provisions, would be "advisory only." (R. 2014 at 2-11, 
2028 at 1507-11.) 
The court declined, however, to require the jury to make specific factual findings. 
(R. 1410-13, 1419-21, 2026 at 1372-73, 1104-08, 2028 at 1508-10.) Instead, the court 
resolved Burningham's stated concerns about the specificity of the verdict form by 
directing that the court would take the information gained from the jury verdict and apply 
it subsequently in the "equity" phase of the case. (R. 1583, 2028 at 1507-11; Ct. App. 
Aplee. Br. at 21, 38; Ct. App. Aplt. Reply Br. at 17 n.8.) The jurors were instructed that 
"[t]he court, not the jury, will determine the dissolution, windup, and termination of the 
LLC" and "not to concern yourselves with such issues." (R. 1158.) 
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a verdict finding "wrongful 
dissolution" of the LLC by Burningham and awarding Wilson post-dissolution damages. 
(R. 1104-08, 1879, 1954, 2023 at 828-29 & 832-33, 2028 at 1532-35.) Wilson then 
argued that the jury had decided all issues and that a judgment should enter on the 
verdict. (R. 1494-1500.) Burningham opposed this request based on the trial record, 
asking for the post-trial determinations previously reserved by the district judge. (R. 
1517-29.) 
The district judge agreed with Wilson, denying Burningham's motion to hold LLC 
proceedings, to determine the members' capital accounts, or to treat the jury's findings as 
advisory only. (R. 1524-29, 1551-57, 1583-87.) Instead, the court entered a judgment 
for Wilson in the full amount of the verdict, representing profits of the LLC totaling more 
than $1.2 million. (R. 1641-42.) No judgment was entered for IARC to repay "loans" 
made to the LLC. (R. 1641-42.) 
Burningham and IARC sought to correct the district court's error through post-
judgment motions. (R. 1686-1716.) The district judge vacated the judgment entered 
against IARC but denied all other relief. (R. 1978-82.) Burningham and IARC then 
posted a bond and appealed. (R. 1671-73, 1846-48, 1968-69, 1978-81, 1983-84.) 
Court of Appeals Proceedings 
In the court of appeals, Burningham argued that the district court improperly 
deprived him of the rights and protections of the LLC Act by failing to apply its 
provisions properly to the parties' dispute. (Ct. App. Aplt. Br. at 19-29.) Burningham 
further argued that, to the extent common law and equity interacted with the LLC Act, 
the court incorrectly instructed the jury and erred in conducting proceedings so as never 
to reach the determinations called for by the LLC Act. (Ct. App. Aplt. Br. at 29-49.) 
In response, Wilson argued that the district court "was not obligated to apply the 
procedures under the Act." (Ct. App. Aplee. Br. at 17.) Wilson further called the LLC 
Act a set of "alternative provisions." (Ct. App. Aplee. Br. at 18.) He relied on pre-LLC 
Act partnership law to argue a plaintiff may choose whether to proceed under the Act. 
(Ct. App. Aplee. Br. at 17.) 
A three-judge panel of the court of appeals affirmed the district court decision. 
Judge Thorne, writing for the panel, ruled that Wilson could recover on a claim the 
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intermediate appeals court denominated as LLC "repudiation." (Ct. App. Op. 1 9 n.4.) 
The court used this theory rather than the "wrongful dissolution" nomenclature invoked 
in the district court. (Ct. App. Op. 1 9 n.4.) The court deliberately departed from the 
Gherman decision, acknowledging that on this record, "if we were to import Gherman 
directly into Utah LLC law, Burningham would appear to be correct that the parties' 
mutual acknowledgment of OLP's existence would preclude a repudiation claim." (Ct. 
App. Op. 1 38.) Instead, the court modified Gherman so that such a prerequisite would 
not exist in Utah law. (Ct. App. Op. 1 39.) The court then affirmed the application of 
this LLC repudiation claim by a showing of anticipatory contract breach. (Id.) 
The court of appeals also resolved Burningham's arguments regarding application 
of the LLC Act by concluding that the jury had impliedly ruled on all the issues he had 
pleaded. The court held that an adequate LLC accounting of the parties' respective 
capital accounts and ownership interests had been presented to and decided by the jury: 
[T]he jury in this case apparently rejected Burningham's allegations that he had 
contributed substantially greater finding to OLP than had Wilson, and, instead, 
adopted Wilson's version of events whereby Wilson was at least a fifty-percent 
owner of OLP. Thus, the jury's verdict considered the dispute between the parties 
as to the ownership percentages of OLP and resolved that dispute in Wilson's 
favor. 
... Under Wilson's version of events, which the jury apparently adopted, Wilson 
and Burningham formed OLP with equal ownership rights and Wilson contributed 
further capital while Burningham only loaned money to OLP through 1ARC. 
Under this set of facts, Wilson's ownership interest in OLP would actually have 
exceeded Burningham's by the time Burningham excluded Wilson from the 
company. 
(Ct. App. Op. 1117, 20.) 
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The court of appeals further rejected Burningham's argument that the district court 
erred in failing to implement its dissolution decision under the LLC Act. The court of 
appeals ruled "it is by no means clear that the district court's order determining the 
August 31. 2001 dissolution date of OLP was intended to be a formal order of dissolution 
under the LLC Act." (Ct. App. Op. ^ 23.) "[T]he purpose of the district court's order 
does not appear to have been to formally dissolve OLP, but rather to establish a cutoff 
date for Wilson's lost profit damages if the jury found that Burningham had breached the 
parties' agreement but had not done so in such a matter [sic] as to constitute a repudiation 
of the agreement." {Id.) Even so, the court ruled there is "no persuasive reason why that 
dissolution would impair the jury's ability to award Wilson repudiation damages" 
because Wilson's repudiation claim "is merely an action for damages between business 
partners, arising from circumstances that will often, but not always, also support 
dissolution of the LLC." (Ct. App. Op. \ 24.) 
Next, the court of appeals affirmed the district court's decision not to supervise a 
winding up and liquidation of the LLC. (Ct. App. Op. J^ 28.) "As a practical matter, after 
the judgment in favor of Wilson, Burningham remained as the member or former member 
most ably situated to perform OLP's winding up." (Ct. App. Op. ^31.) "While the 
district court perhaps failed to comply with the statute when it did not expressly 'direct' 
Bumingham" in winding up, the court of appeals concluded that no prejudice resulted. 
{id.) 
Lastly, the court of appeals ruled that there was no error in how the district court 
handled Burningham's equitable issues because, under Zions First Nat'I Bank v. Rocky 
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Mm. Irr., Inc., 795 P.2d 658 (Utah 1990), a jury's factual determinations bind a trial 
court's equitable determinations when both turn on the same operative facts. (Ct. App. 
Op. TI 34.) The court rejected Burningham's and IARC's subsidiary arguments and 
affirmed the district court's judgment. (Ct. App. Op. ^ 51.) 
This Court then granted certiorari to review the court of appeals' decision. 
Statement of Facts 
In 1988, Wayne Burningham formed IARC as a sole corporation. (R. 2021 at 
493-94.) IARC coated eyeglass lenses on a machine purchased in 1993. (R. 182, 2024 at 
1061-63; Add. Ex. U, % 2.) Since its inception, IARC's principal customer was Cole 
Vision. (R. 2021 at 493-94, 2024 at 1057, 1061, 1072^73, 1075, 1083.) Burningham 
hired Richard Wilson as an IARC employee in 1995. (R. 2020 at 389, 2025 at 1138; Exs. 
153, 155.) 
In 1998, Burningham offered Wilson the opportunity to form OLP. (R. 2018 at 
235-42, 2024 at 1081.) OLP purchased a second lens coating machine, incurring bank 
debt of approximately $573,000. (R. 6, 43, 2019 at 283-84; Ex. 69.) Both IARC and 
OLP were to use the second machine and share operating expenses on a per lens basis. 
(R. 2019 at 271, 2020 at 406, 2021 at 495.) The two companies each had their own 
customers. (R. 44, 1377-78 & 1383, 2020 at 423, 2019 at 274-75, 2021 at 494 & 578, 
2024 at 1096-97,2027 at 1397-1400.) All transactions were handled through IARC. (R. 
2019 at 270, 2020 at 439.) 
Burningham and Wilson orally agreed at the outset to share equal ownership and 
control of OLP, to contribute matching capital contributions, and to equally share profits 
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and losses. (R. 6, 42, 2019 at 274 & 286, 2021 at 491 & 499-500, 2028 at 1511.) No 
agreement was reached as to what would happen if one party contributed greater capital 
investments than the other. (R. 2020 at 422; see Exs. 68-69.) 
The two LLC members executed a document titled "Operating Agreement," 
which, despite its name, the parties acknowledge as a bare-bones expense agreement with 
I ARC that makes no mention of LLC internal operations. (Ex. 69; R. 7, 2026 at 1324.) 
Other than a standard form articles of organization, there was no written operating 
agreement or governing document executed between the LLC members that defined their 
rights and responsibilities as members. (Exs. 68-69.) 
A dispute aiose when Wilson ceased making capital contributions after investing 
$23,500. (R. 2019 at 285-86, 2020 at 405 & 437 & 452; Exs. 209-14.) Burningham 
continued infusing OLP with operating capital totaling $330,000 to $340,000 by at least 
August 2001 and more than $500,000 by the time of trial in late 2004. (R. 2025 at 1203-
04; Exs. 64-66, 172, 244, 246, 613.) Burningham directed this capital to OLP from his 
sole corporation, IARC. (R. 2021 at 500, 504.) The capital infusions were labeled 
"loans" or "advances" by Burningham's bookkeeper using the default coding provisions 
of the Quick Books computer accounting system. (R. 2021 at 673-76, 2025 at 1189-92.) 
A certified public accountant employed by Burningham and OLP then treated them as 
Burningham's capital contributions and labeled them accordingly. (R. 2021 at 673-76.) 
The dispute between the members ripened when Wilson claimed that Cole Vision 
was OLP's customer, entitling Wilson to profits from IARC's longtime principal 
customer. (R. 2018 at 236 & 239, 2019 at 269, 2021 at 494, 2024 at 1081-83; see R. 7.) 
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When reconciliation efforts failed, Wilson filed suit advancing contract and fiduciary 
duty claims and seeking an LLC accounting. (R. 1, 2019 at 335-37, 2020 at 415-16 & 
420, 2021 at 646 & 650-61, 2022 at 757-58 & 789; Ex. 33.) Bumingham then terminated 
Wilson's 1ARC employment. (Exs. 72-74.) Bumingham nevertheless acknowledged the 
ongoing existence of OLP and the members' statutory rights and obligations. (Exs. 73, 
593.) Bumingham then counterclaimed against Wilson seeking judicial dissolution, an 
accounting, and a winding up of OLP's business pursuant to the LLC Act. (R. 38-66.) 
Summary of the Arguments 
This Court should reverse and remand for three principal reasons. 
First, the decision below should be reversed because the governing provisions of 
the LLC Act did not form the basis for the judgment entered in the district court. The 
LLC Act applies to this dispute between LLC members. In the absence of a written 
operating agreement, the Act is the members' contract. The Act provides that profits are 
allocated to members according to their capital accounts. 
Here, the decision on the parties' capital accounts was specifically reserved for the 
district court but never reached. The court of appeals erred in concluding on this record 
that the jury properly considered the parties' ownership interests and made binding 
findings. The effect was to materially prejudice Bumingham by depriving him of the 
chance to be heard on his principal claim using the governing provisions of the LLC Act 
as the rule of decision. 
Second, the decision below should be reversed because the court of appeals 
incorrectly applied the common law in this case. The court formulated an "LLC 
i n 
repudiation" claim that deviates from the common law standard and conflicts with the 
record in this case. "Repudiation" under the Gherman standard was one element of a 
"wrongful dissolution" damages limitation addressed in the district court. It was not 
common law anticipatory repudiation as pleaded by Wilson. 
Furthermore, the court of appeals failed to give effect to the district court's legal 
determination judicially dissolving the LLC. The elements were met for statutory 
judicial dissolution, which is a "rightful" dissolution as a matter of law. The courts 
should give effect to the statutory implications of a judicial dissolution, which include a 
winding up, accounting, and final distribution under the Act. 
Gherman was wrongly applied in this case. As a matter of law, the repudiation 
element found in Gherman was improperly modified to eliminate the very distinction that 
gives rise to the extraordinary Gherman remedy. That element cannot be met on this 
record, where the parties had a dispute over the scope and accounting of their LLC but 
not over its existence. "Repudiation" as articulated by the court of appeals cannot stand 
on this record under either a statutory or common law analysis. 
Third, the court of appeals erred in sanctioning a procedure in this case that 
deprived Bumingham of the opportunity to have each of his claims and defenses litigated. 
The court of appeals found no reason to insist upon the winding up of OLP defined by the 
LLC Act. This despite the fact that the Act says the court "shall" direct the company's 
winding up and liquidation. By declining to require use of the LLC Act, the court below 
allowed a judgment for LLC profits to stand independent of the provisions of the Act. 
Those provisions treat LLC profits as part of a member's capital account, to be 
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determined and distributed in a winding up - but only after payment of debt and 
satisfaction of creditors. Under the Act, Wilson would be entitled to a capital accounts 
credit, not a check for profits free and clear of any LLC obligations. Burningham was 
entitled to an actual, reviewable LLC accounting, which he pleaded but never received. 
Finally, the district court's procedural decisions left Burningham without a forum 
in which to try his purely equitable (as opposed to statutory) claims and defenses, which 
differed on their operative facts from the claims considered by the jury. Utah law 
requires that a litigant have notice and an opportunity to be heard before its claims and 
defenses are foreclosed. Reversal is called for where such basic process was not 
afforded. 
For each of these reasons, individually and collectively, the decision of the court 
of appeals should be reversed and the case remanded for appropriate further proceedings. 
Argument 
I. The court of appeals committed reversible error by failing to require the 
district court to adjudicate this case using the governing provisions of the 
LLC Act before entering a judgment. 
A. The Act's provisions provide the LLC contract. 
"Utah enacted the Limited Liability Company Act, Utah Code Ann. § 48-2b-101 
to -158 (1998) (repealed 2001), in 1991 in response to the need for expanded flexibility 
and utility in companies with limited liability and pass-through taxation for the owners.5' 
CCA L.C. v. Millsap, 2005 UT 42, ^ 11 n.l, 116 P.3d 366 (citing Brent R. Armstrong, 
New Revisions to Utah's Limited Liability Company Act - the LLC Revolution Rolls On, 
Utah State Bar Journal, June/July 2001). "The Act provided 'default' rules which apply 
automatically in the absence of rules specified in the governing documents, the articles of 
organization, or the operating agreement." Id. 
"In 2001, Utah enacted the Revised Limited Liability Company Act, which added 
new definitions, varying and limiting certain obligations . . . ." Id. (citing Ruth Quigley 
Hawe, Recent Developments in Utah Law, Utah's Revised Limited Liability Act, 2001 
Utah L. Rev. 1099, 1100-01). "The Revised Act was effective July 1, 2001. It repealed 
and replaced the original Act." Id. 
The Act contemplates actions between members to "interpret, apply, or enforce 
the . . . duties, obligations, or liabilities between and among a company, its members and 
managers, or the rights or powers of, or restrictions on, the company, the members or 
managers." Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-505. This Court has applied the provisions of the 
Act to disputes between LLC members, even when the party is a "former" member. See, 
e.g., Millsap, 2005 UT 42, fflj 16-22 (holding Act's expulsion provisions applied to 
member who had previously resigned); Duke v. Graham, 2007 UT 31, ^ 14-22, 158 P.3d 
540 (holding LLC Act allowed operating agreement to modify Act's member removal 
provisions); Dairies v. Vincent, 2008 UT 51, ^ 40-41, 190 P.3d 1269 (holding Act 
protected member from personal liability). 
The LLC Act uses a "contract by statute" model. (Armstrong, supra, Vol. 14, No. 
5, at 13, cited in Millsap, 2005 UT 42, \ 11 n.l, and submitted as Add. Ex. D.) cc[T]he 
statute sets up numerous 'default' rules that apply if the governing documents for the 
LLC (the articles of organization and the operating agreement) do not provide 
otherwise." (Id.) 
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In the absence of a written operating agreement or other document to the contrary, 
the Revised Act's provisions control and define the rights and responsibilities of Utah 
LLC members; the procedures for determining and accounting for members' ownership 
interests; and the creation, existence, dissolution, and winding up of the entity. See, e.g., 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 48-2c-401 to -1008, -1201 to -1214, -1301 to -1309. In cases in 
which the provisions of the Revised Act are implicated, their terms provide the yardstick 
for measuring LLC members' conduct. See Millsap, 2005 UT 42, ^ 16 & 22. 
In this case, neither the articles of organization nor an LLC operating agreement 
provided rules governing members' interests in the company, the allocation of profits and 
losses, capital accounts, dissolution, or winding up. (Exs. 68-69; R. 2019 at 280, 2020 at 
400, 2022 at 771-72, 787-88); Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-102(16). In the absence of any 
such written agreement, the provisions of the Act provide the operating agreement for the 
LLC. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 48-2c-102(3), -901 to -906, -1001, -1003, -1308; 
Armstrong, supra, Vol. 14, No. 7, at 24 (Add. Ex. D); Spires v. Casterline, 778 N.Y.S.2d 
259, 265-66 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004). In other words, the Act's provisions provide the rule 
of decision because the Act is the contract. 
B. The court of appeals prejudicially erred in failing to require the 
application of the Act to Burningham's case. 
In the absence of a governing document on point, the provisions of the LLC Act 
dictate that a member's interests in the company, and that member's allocation of profits 
and losses, are calculated according to the member's statutorily defined capital account. 
See id. §§ 48-2c-102(3), -901 to -906, -1001, -1003, -1308. The Revised Aci defines a 
capital account: 
"Capital account," unless otherwise provided in the operating agreement, 
means the account, as adjusted from time to time, maintained by the company for 
each member to reflect the value of all contributions by that member, the amount 
of all distributions to that member or the member's assignee, the member's share 
of profits, gains, and losses of the company, and the member's share of the net 
assets of the company upon dissolution and winding up that are distributable to the 
member or the member's assignee. 
Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-102(3). 
The capital account adjusts when capital contributions are made "by or on behalf 
of an existing member" and in other instances defined by statute. Id. § 48-2c-903(l)(b), 
(c). "If the operating agreement does not otherwise provide, profits and losses are 
allocated in proportion to the members' capital account balances." Id. § 48-2c-906. 
Upon dissolution, capital accounts are used to calculate a member's entitlement to 
company profits or allocation of company losses after first satisfying creditors. Utah 
Code Ann. § 48-2c-1003, -1308. 
The court of appeals recognized this law, but then failed to apply it properly in the 
context of this dispute. The lower court held that "the provisions of the LLC Act serve as 
default positions that govern an LLC if its members do not include contrary language in 
their operating agreement or in the LLC's articles of organization." (Ct. App. Op. j^ 18.) 
"The parties here did not incorporate any such changes in OLP's governing documents, 
and thus, the LLC Act provides the appropriate procedures for determining, among other 
things, Wilson and Burningham's respective ownership interests in OLP." (Id.) The 
court agreed with Burningham's assessment of the Act: 
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The LLC Act provides that an LLC shall maintain a capital account for 
each member, representing that member's share of the net assets of the company. 
See [Utah Code Ann.] § 48-2c-903(l). A member's capital account reflects the 
member's initial contribution and is then adjusted upwards or downwards based 
on the member's additional contributions and on certain distributions to the 
member. See id. A member's voting rights, rights to share in profits, and 
ownership interest in the LLC are all measured in proportion to the member's 
capital account. See id; see also id. §§ 48-2c-803 (determining required voting 
majorities for member-managed LLCs in terms of profit interests), -906 
(allocating profit interests between members in proportion to their capital 
accounts). 
(Ct.App.Qp.119.) 
Notwithstanding this correct recitation of the law, the court of appeals incorrectly 
held that the jury had decided the LLC capital accounts issue against Burningham. The 
court reasoned: "Because the question of capital contributions to OLP was a factual one, 
it was appropriate for the jury to determine the parties' ownership interests in OLP." (Ct. 
App. Op. T| 21.) The court of appeals' analysis of this issue is premised on prejudicial 
error. 
The jury did not and could not "determine the parties' ownership interests in OLP" 
without proper legal instructions on capital accounts using the LLC Act as the rule of 
decision. The LLC Act's "default provisions" on capital accounts were "adopted by the 
parties when they failed to contractually vary them." (Ct. App. Op. ^ 20.) Thus, the 
provisions of the Act provide the rule of decision. However, Wilson and the district court 
both expressly agreed that the court, not the jury, would decide the capital accounts issue. 
(R. 2026 at 1319-30.) The district court did not instruct the jury on how to consider or 
apply capital contributions in determining ownership interests. (R. 1109-72, 2026 at 
1319-30.) 
The very sections of the LLC Act that the court of appeals cites provide the rule of 
decision to any fact finder designated to decide this issue. By agreement of the parties 
and the district court, however, these provisions deliberately were not given to the jury as 
tools for measuring such conduct. (R. 2026 at 1330.) Consequently, as a matter of law, 
the jury could not do what the court of appeals assumed it "apparently" did - decide the 
ownership interest issue adversely to Burningham. (Ct. App. Op. U 20.) At least, the jury 
could not legitimately have done so on this record. 
Very specific conversations with the district judge took place on the record 
regarding this issue. (R. 2026 at 1319-32, 2028 at 1507-11.) The district court ruled that 
questions asked of the jury would only be a jumping-off point for determining capital 
accounts. In examining the proposed special verdict forms, the court observed that the 
jury verdict questions were "advisory unless you agree that they're binding." (R. 2028 at 
1508.) 
THE COURT: . . . 1 think it's only an advisory answer and I still have to use my 
judgment and my findings. 
THE COURT: It doesn't matter how they answer it, I make my own findings of 
fact based on the evidence on that issue for purposes of equitable issues. Now you 
could agree on the record that you want the jury to answer all of those questions 
and then they become the binding answers. Then I put in more questions that 
relieve me of the findings. If they answer it over the objection of one of you as I 
understand the law . . . if they answer the question and you don't agree, it can only 
be advisory no matter what we do. . . . 
(R. 2028 at 1510.) With that direct assurance from the court, Burningham agreed to a 
non-specific jury verdict form, reserved his interest-by-capital-accounts theory for the 
subsequent court proceedings, and withdrew his counterclaim regarding the amount and 
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effect of Wilson's capital contributions for subsequent determination by the court. (R. 
2026 at 1327-30, 2028 at 1508-10, 2029 at 3-4.) 
On this record, it was prejudicial error for the court of appeals to suggest that the 
jury had decided the capital accounts question. Burningham's case was never heard. His 
whole theory of the case from the very outset was based on a determination of capital 
accounts. (R. 38-66.) The verdict form put to the jury asked only about whether the 
parties had initially agreed to a 50/50 arrangement, a fact not in dispute. (R. 1204-08.) 
Indeed, the district court observed that the initial 50/50 arrangement was all but irrelevant 
under the procedure the court had outlined: 
THE COURT: The first question is you agree they had an agreement to form an 
owner's 50/50 partners [sic]. I wasn't even sure we needed the 50/50, but 
essentially that's conceded. I'm not sure it matters either way. 
THE COURT: And at least at the outset I think that would be my finding. It's a 
whole different story of what you might argue thereafter. 
(R. 2028 at 1511.) 
The only reason Bumingham would agree to a jury considering this was in light of 
the court's ruling that this was informational only for the court's purposes. As 
Burningham's counsel observed, "Plaintiffs are claiming today that it [the members' 
profits interest] stayed 50/50 and that they're entitled to 50 percent of the profits. We're 
claiming that that changed because the law made it change. . . . We think it's up to the 
Court to decide whether the law made it change." (R. 2026 at 1327.) The district court 
observed, "then you don't need to instruct the jury on how to discern that." (R. 2026 at 
1327.) 
The district cuin i ^])cciiiLaiiy hciu LUctL an) jur) . • ; • ' :i„ <-i\ : *. •>• 
issues were advisor) o ~\ a i \h^ C<M:M fr av/ in iv^in- Or- -\Mf» -.he : w_Li;n,.. al in~ 
capita] accounts que^ti— '» / o j - .1; i • -- < . 20. */ ^ . ^ j 20?8 at 150R. ^ 2ft°'> at 
6.) I lie uaiit rc|cclcd 1 'lUimnfdianfs unih iilimi llial spculu questions should be asked 
olUiLjui) Lo a ^ a i iliL- ^oui 1 in this detei 1 1 lination. (K. aav-p 1372-VJ . I 508-J\>.J 
Nevertheless, the dhtri ' o- at then -.u-1 -<.<aiicnd\ !.„fu ., d tn address ihe capiat aco :si:i 
issiu * a-. , • airt was > : "-..-l-.1', ;'•>• ^  N\ 0 • .a ; ^.) 
Thus, the capital contributions issue was 1 icvei pi opei ly coi isidei ed by a ti iei ol fact in 
light of die rclc^ mi He ennui: •;:•.• Burningham was maki.all) prejudiced lj a ia^i 
1 ii idei hearing ai id mini" on Wilson's t!u:or\ of the easi but never on Buminphani'--
it ico! y of the case. 
"'Although a party has the right ^ nave a jury assess his damages, he has no 1 ight 
1^  have a p iry dicta.tr t f -a i rh an awaul the kgal consequence- <T IU assessim af" Judd 
v. Di i '^ *,-. •- • 1 Ma_ . t'rutis \ l A o * '* h 7 J 6 
S.E.2d 525, 529 (Va. l^o9;;. "[I]t is the ji iry's duly iu ucienni: v . .. . s naae . 
a plaintiff in fact sustained, but it is 1 ip to ti ic com: a? ci-ufon»: du un> s laiding- iu 
applicable la wJ Id. (cc j if 11 1 1 lii ig district court's o; a-.a- 1: =r- appo ioeishbv- n p t~ 
]i iry's determinatioi 1 of 1 lighei ai 1 101 11 it of dan lages) A, ji 11 y i :t :iay ! 1 iff ill its role to "'assi 11 e 
a fail and equitable resolution of factual issues,'" but a trial court is still "compelled to 
apply the law to 'he jur-'* vrrdirt " Id (quoting ^ \ p I S Juries § 10 (1997)). 
TI le 1 1! 5 • • • - . : - • • '••- . ' . • a- ^ a n s aovei J- an • OUT 
issues including damages, turns dncetiy on a y- T-a ^aiuuiatiun ui me : < IK \ 
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capital accounts. Without a resolution of the capital accounts issue, judgment could not 
properly enter on whether an LLC member had the requisite authority to do what he did, 
acted in compliance with the parties' statutorily defined contract or fiduciary duties, or 
suffered damages. 
Capital contributions are but one element of an LLC capital account. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 48-2c-102(3). Also includable are the allocations of profits, gains, and 
losses of the company and the amount of distributions to a member. See id. Where no 
such analysis was ever undertaken, the court of appeals incorrectly premised its 
conclusion on its review of the capital contribution dispute. (Ct. App. Op. f^ij 2-21.) 
This Court need not decide whether capital accounts determinations are always for 
the district court or whether a jury may make the decision. In this case, all parties agreed 
the capital accounts determination should be made by the district judge. (R. 2026 at 
1330.) Reversible error resulted when this subsequently was not done, with the court of 
appeals then recharacterizing the issue as having been put to and decided by the jury. 
The effect of the appellate ruling was to allow a judgment in this LLC dispute without 
proper consideration and application of the LLC Act. 
For these reasons, which appear of record, the case should be reversed and 
remanded for a proper application of the LLC Act. The judgment against Burningham is 
based on an erroneous legal foundation that is prejudicial as a matter of law. Burningham 
is entitled to a judgment that considers and incorporates the relevant governing provisions 
oftheLLCAct. 
II. 1 he common law was incoi iccin .UM-U 
For the independent reasons set u -'-. : hi r^ ;. is.. * ^-n; : i--dd / . M ' I ^ aiiJ 
remand because tl ic decisioi i below i • p^nn*cd or r,: ;ncorrect application o'"-hc 
common law. 
A. The LLC "repudiation" claim described by the court of appeals is at 
odds with the common law and with the context in which this issue 
arose in these proceedings. 
1 ' : ..i,;( - r \ r roust nfappeals purported ^ ^ i f ; r ^ 
and aJopt an LLC "rcpudjaiiun" cause of autiuji. I J I C L - . ,, • :. . i n 
various ways; fN- the eo -rl said Wilson pleaded "repudiatioi i" ii i Ins con lplaii it (Ct. App. 
i * die ronrt C'iiinlt - s ^repudiamn i. -s• • Mi ai, U.e "vronrfn1 dissolution" 
iiojiiciiuauiic - d. : . . . * • . v '•• called tl le 
claim a ,aiHe oi aUns. ioi n:cnc) damages for repudiation u! an LL^. [iliatj uoes exist 
independently from the I I ,C Act" and which is allowed "t« • po-.^ ^d - -urddc d a. Luires 
oft] ic 'I -I ,C • Vet" (Ct Vj : p. Op ^ 13); (n >) 1 1 ic coi n t ;t efei i ed t o it as a "pi eexisting 
comri ion law action for i epudiation" (Ct. App. Op J^ 14); (v) tl ic <_*> . ueue- «! « • 
represents the cause of action considered in the Gherman, Jeantww. JCV •* <///\ 
decisions discir: s d tuid'er linciii (( 'I App. 1 >p. ^ | I >~ In; A'ce Part II.C, infra"1* (VO fhc 
court said it is not clear whether the clain i sounds ii i coi lit act, toi t, oi botl i (Ct \pp Op . ]\ 
15 i i,6); and (vii) the coi irt called it a damages claim that has i 10 connection to the 
dissolution of a company. (O App. Op, j^ 24.) 
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This Court should not allow the court of appeals to alter the LLC landscape in this 
confused manner. These competing and inconsistent descriptions of a newly minted 
common law "LLC repudiation claim" lose sight of the context of this dispute. 
Wilson's complaint pleaded a cause of action for common law anticipatory 
repudiation under the parties5 LLC agreement. (R. 18.) Anticipatory repudiation, taught 
in first-year contracts courses, describes a common law claim for breach of contract 
based on actions taken or statements made before performance under a contract is due. 
See, e.g., Black's Law Dictionary 1306 (7th ed. 1999). Wilson claimed in his initial 
pleading, and throughout the case, that the parties had orally agreed to a 50/50 ownership 
in the LLC covering new accounts, and that Burningham had violated the parties' 
contract - anticipatorily and otherwise - by failing to honor that agreement. (R. 6, 18-22, 
2016 at 14-15.) 
Before trial, Burningham filed motions seeking legal determinations that the LLC 
Act must be applied to determine the parties' ownership interests. (R. 608-27, 523-32, 
669-70, 882-87, 899-901, 934-36.) Burningham showed that the undisputed fact record 
called for dissolution of the LLC as of August 31, 2001, with a winding up of the LLC 
and distributions to its members as specified by the LLC Act to take place pursuant to the 
statute. (R. 608-27.) "Throughout the course of the litigation, Burningham attempted to 
have the dispute resolved through application of the LLC Act and sought a judicial 
dissolution, accounting, and winding up of OLP's business pursuant to the LLC Act." 
(Ct. App. Op. 1 9) 
Wilsoi ) respond id b;» a i j»11111 p d»-[| *,,( u '"' •"" '• micdliv iln i I t . \u piovisions 
in seeking contract dan- igc^ (R. 6%- /Ui. /lS--lv., ;., ..uppuiu he uigu^d that Gherman 
ana Jcaness aha-a u ' ir i damages regardless of an\ di.-oluii- -. ^ T.n ) 
It was in ihr. ua icxl dial < r'lu ' -• . • s ,r • . •- . ,n n K ; «-^ urt with its 
attendant definitions and limitations. It was not a claii n that was pleaded: it was i lot 
Wilson's comin: \ l.iw :iu Ij .-i*M \ repudi a i ^ daiai ; U,IK
 t? damages limitation 
concept. - \ n: , :h'k rontev* <-^  tii-. .Linages argument when the district cot irt 
allowed Vvibon ^ * •• •• • ; - . , ; » • ' . 
The K .a:r of appeals decision glosses o\ci Caio ncccb^aiy coiitext, creatiiig a 
\ ia M; chain d;a. hears no resemblance either to its con in ioi 1 law roots or to its 
consio • • . - • • • i - • • V,J1:(.«.J a new • c.cc .;i;, , c a* rcpuicthc ' an 
LLC, d;c juurt of appeals in^onccth * ^euite^ .such d ciunn v. . -! < • 
repudiation pleaded in Wilson's complaint, inconsistently equates it to the 
GhermanlJeanesslWanlass concept of wrongful dissoh ition, ai id s imul taneous roc: •. U 
the very elei i lent that iouns the foundation upon "ULH In ihe pnncipli mi lliuse t ases 
stands. 
I lie court ^f appeals' confused approach is not and should not be die law Foi 
each oi the iv < cussed ne\f this < 'oiirl should tene! (he court of appeals newly 
created "LLC repudiation" claii n and remand this case for resolution accoi dii ig to tl lose 
principles that properly goven 1 the resolutic -n - -r ihi ca .. 
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B. The LLC Act provides the rule of decision on dissolution. 
1. Judicial dissolution, not wrongful dissolution, is the correct 
analysis. 
In determining issues governed by statute, this Court looks to and applies the plain 
language of those statutes. See Allisen v. American Legion Post No. 134, 763 P.2d 806, 
809 (Utah 1988). Legislative enactments "establish the laws of this state respecting the 
subjects to which they relate." Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-2. When LLC disputes arise, the 
provisions of the LLC Act control. See, e.g., Millsap, 2005 UT 42, U 16, 116 P.3d 366. 
The LLC Act enumerates specified events of dissolution, including judicial 
dissolution. Id. § 48-2c-1201(7). If the court determines grounds exist for judicial 
dissolution, it may enter a decree dissolving the company and specifying the effective 
date of the dissolution. Id. § 48-2c-1213(l). 
The provisions invoked by Burningham provide for dissolution by any member if 
there is "deadlock" or if "it is not reasonably practical to carry on the business of the 
company in conformity with its articles of organization and operating agreement." Id. 
§ 48-2c-1210(2)(a), (c), (e); R. 616. The other grounds under the statute (illegal, 
oppressive, or fraudulent acts, and misapplication or waste of company assets) were not 
invoked by either member as grounds for dissolution here. Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-
1210(2)(b), (d); R. 616, 703, 717-20. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 
Wilson on his ownership claim, the district court granted Bumingham's motion judicially 
dissolving the LLC. (R. 2026 at 1282.) 
The corni ui appeals hcju. ^ . .••-;* * * ":< < •. • -"rs 
chaiacterizatic >rnie ; 1 C Act as . ompiehuiM\c : ,ie: ^:in ia^ assertion dku ii, the 
absence of con; u'i-.ii tAia^-ir ?: ;ho ™n!nirv *hc T T r V:*{ pr^vld*. • 4L' , \ J - * -
proceduies ioi ; •..- > •. . ^ - ; inpeais 
declined, 1 lowevei , to recognize the effect of tl ie district coui t's i uimy juuiciudy 
dissolving the 1 T ^ V- .., ..-.* L Id ih a " i ; K b \ p . n u ^ m n c , : i t h a i flu* d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s 
(M--I-. • v T»U:< : •' * .:'{!•» ' i »•*' ' -••!-;.! • «• - ' s; ] *A as intended to be a 
formal order of dissolution UIJUU i n c i t e '• . • • ; * • ' coi n t fi ii tJiei 
noted tl iat ""the district ciairl ma) oi may not have actual]) d i ^ u k e d OLIL* (Ct. App. 
This rcch.iucU n ation o( what Innls plan, in flu district i uiiil constitutes 
reversible legal error. 1 ..c dibtiiu court granted Burningham s motion foi judicial 
dissoli Hion, "which Bi irninghani filed seeking a forn lal oi dei of dissoli ition i u ide i tl ie LLC 
Act (R 608/) 1 he coi n I oi appeals is coi rect in saying ,\w a ^ n u l coi irt did not comply 
formally and fully with those provisions. That is a cei iti al point of tl lis appeal 1 1 ic 
district i nurt instead lei V j»ar\\ \cnlu* supplant a proper LLC analysis. 
-a a appeals ruled that no judicial dissolution, occurred, (1 tat 
conclusion is wrong on lime face of the in unl and should hr reversed 11, as Ihc eouil ot 
appeals suggests, die distiict court did not n l fact judicially dissolve OLP as 
Burningham's granted motion asked, then a reversal and remand is necessary to 
I Ilia A\ ,tri< I ci ill';, unappcaled inline lli.il lla elements ol the judicial 
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dissolution statute were met as a matter of law as of August 31, 2001. (R. 2026 at 1282.) 
The implications of such a dissolution are discussed next. 
2. Judicial dissolution is a legally "rightful" dissolution that carries 
with it statutory implications not followed here. 
The court of appeals was unconcerned with whether the LLC was actually 
dissolved because it saw no connection between its articulated "repudiation" claim and 
the LLC's dissolution. (Ct. App. Op. ffl| 23-24.) Here, especially, the court of appeals' 
reference to "repudiation" to blend both a wrongful dissolution concept and a contract 
claim for damages needs careful consideration. 
First, taking the "repudiation" term to mean "anticipatory contract repudiation," 
the court of appeals overlooked that the LLC contract was defined by statute and that the 
statute therefore provides the rule of decision in determining a breach. See supra Part I. 
This means that such claims must be adjudicated using the provisions of the Act, 
including those governing dissolution of an LLC and its consequences. The court of 
appeals recognizes or at least suggests this was not done. (Ct. App. Op. ffl| 23, 48.) 
More importantly, taking the "repudiation" term to mean the "wrongful 
dissolution" found by the jury, judicial dissolution of an LLC is legally inconsistent with 
such a finding. Because the LLC was dissolved in accordance with the plain terms of the 
Act, under authority of the supervising court, it is a fortiori a "rightful" dissolution by 
operation of law. 
In Wanlass v. DLand Title, 790 P.2d 568 (Utah App. 1990), a case decided under 
statutory partnership law, the court applied plain statutory language in rejecting a claim 
of wrongful dissolution. Id. at 572. The court held that, because the partnership had 
dissolved according to the terms of the statute, a claim for wrongful dissolution would 
not lie. See id. (citing relevant statutory provisions). Consequently, no basis existed for 
the plaintiff to claim extra-statutory relief based on a "wrongful dissolution" concept. 
See id. at 571, 572. This analysis is correct. 
In an appellate case from another jurisdiction, the Florida Court of Appeals 
likewise held to the operative language of the statute and eschewed a contrary wrongful 
dissolution argument. In Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp. v. Southern Oaks Health Care, 
Inc., 732 So.2d 1156 (Fla. App. 1999), Southern Oaks claimed Horizon wrongfully 
dissolved their partnership, allegedly entitling Southern Oaks to future projected 
earnings. Id. at 1157-58. The court disagreed, holding that the determination of when a 
partnership dissolved and the parameters of liability of the partners upon dissolution were 
determined by statute, and that the statute did not provide for damages based on future 
partnership earnings. Id. at 1159-61. The court rejected Southern Oaks' claim that the 
cause of action was merely contractual: 
We find Southern Oaks' argument without merit. . . . [T]he trial court's finding 
that the parties are incapable of continuing to operate in business together is a 
finding of "irreconcilable differences," a permissible reason for dissolving the 
partnerships under the express terms of the partnership agreements. Thus, 
dissolution was not "wrongful," assuming there can be "wrongful" dissolutions, 
and Southern Oaks was not entitled to damages for lost future profits. 
Id. at 1159; see id. at 1159-60 (noting governing statute "does not refer to the dissolutions 
as rightful or wrongful" but rather "outlines the events causing dissolution without any 
provision for liability for damages"). The court concluded: 
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There no longer appears to be "wrongful" dissolution - either dissolution is 
provided for by contract or statute or the dissolution was improper and the 
dissolution order should be reversed. In the instant case, because the dissolution 
either came within the terms of the partnership agreements or [Florida Statutes] 
paragraph 620.880l(5)(c) (judicial dissolution where it is not reasonably 
practicable to carry on the partnership business), Southern Oaks' claim for lost 
future profits is without merit. 
Id. at 1161 (footnote omitted). 
Similarly, and importantly for this appeal, courts considering limited liability 
company disputes have carefully hewed to the language of the LLC statute in 
determining whether an LLC is properly dissolved by judicial authority and what the 
ramifications of such a dissolution will be. See, e.g., Kirksey v. Grohmann, 754 N.W.2d 
825 (S.D. 2008) (reversing and remanding with an order for statutory dissolution and 
winding up) (collecting cases); Spires v. Casterline, 778 N.Y.S.2d 259 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
2004) (ordering judicial dissolution when one member withdrew); Weinmann v. Duhon, 
818 So.2d 206 (La. App. 2002) (vacating and remanding district court contract judgment 
and holding that statutory dissolution was the proper remedy). 
The Utah Legislature passes legislation advisedly. See State v. Hobbs, 2003 UT 
App 27, H 21, 64 P.3d 1218. In contrast to the LLC Act, Utah's Partnership Act has 
wrongful dissolution provisions. See Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-28(2), -34, -35(2); Wanlass, 
790 P.2d at 572. The drafters of the LLC Act considered but did not adopt the Uniform 
Limited Liability Company Act, which would have provided for "wrongful dissociation" 
in a manner similar to the Partnership Act. See Uniform LLC Act Ann. § 602 (1996); 
Armstrong, Vol. 14, No. 5, at 12. 
Dissolution by proper judicial authority on the grounds invoked by Burningham 
under the Act is, by definition, lawful and "rightful" dissolution, implementing at that 
point statutory procedures for winding up the company. Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-
1213(2). These procedures contemplate an accounting of the LLC. See infra Part 111. It 
was error to ignore these statutory mandates and allow post-dissolution damages as if the 
statute had no effect. See Southern Oaks, 732 So.2d at 1161. 
Because of this legal error, the court below improperly affirmed denial of 
Burningham's legal motions asking the court to follow and give effect to statutory 
dissolution and winding up procedures. (R. 625, 891, 1023, 1203-07, 2024 at 979-81 & 
989-90, 2026 at 1278, 2028 at 1550 & 1649-50, 1686-88, 1700-03, 1876, 1980.) This 
Court should reverse on the law and remand for proceedings that properly follow and 
apply the LLC Act. 
C. Gherman was wrongly adapted and applied. 
The notion of "wrongful dissolution" is rooted in the seminal partnership case of 
Gherman v. Colburn, 140 Cal. Rptr. 330 (Cal. App. 1977). Gherman was a statutory tort 
case brought under California law. See id. at 341, 336, 340 & n.10. Its reasoning, 
however, suggested that the statute incorporated common law partnership principles. 
Gherman was followed without analysis in Jeaness v. Besnilian, 706 P.2d 143 (Nev. 
1985) (per curiam), then cited in dicta in Wanlass v. D Land Title, 790 P.2d 568, 572 
(Utah App. 1990). 
The parties in Gherman entered into a joint venture to purchase land. 140 Cal. 
Rptr. at 336. Once the purchase was completed, Colburn denied the existence of any 
391287v.2 O O 
joint venture with Gherman whatsoever: 'There exists no 'Colburn-Gherman joint 
venture'. .. ." Id. at 337, 344. The court distinguished such an outright tortious denial of 
the relationship's existence from the more common case of a partnership contract breach. 
Id. at 342-43. Holding that the former was more akin to the breach of a non-contract 
duty, and relying on the codification of that principle in the California statutes, the court 
permitted the plaintiff partner to recover damages beyond the date of dissolution. Id. at 
340-41,344-45. 
The court allowed such recovery when "there has been a repudiation of the basic 
concept - a denial of the very existence of a partnership or joint venture relationship in 
any form or at any time." Id. at 343. This kind of repudiation is not "the failure, without 
legal excuse, to perform any promise which forms the whole or part of the contract." Id. 
Thus, even if the entire contract is breached, this is not the "repudiation" tort described in 
Gherman. See id. Gherman distinguished its special tortious "repudiation" from the 
circumstances in which a defendant "recognizes the existence of a partnership but 
breaches some obligation in the performance of the partnership agreement not amounting 
to wrongful dissolution in contravention of the agreement." Id. at 339. 
The court of appeals panel acknowledged that, on this record, "if we were to 
import Gherman directly into Utah LLC law, Burningham would appear to be correct that 
the parties' mutual acknowledgment of OLP's existence would preclude a repudiation 
claim." (Ct. App. Op. |^ 38.) Nevertheless, the court modified the Gherman claim so that 
such a prerequisite does not exist in Utah law - eliminating the very distinction that gave 
rise to the concept in the first place. (Ct. App. Op. ^ 39.) The court then affirmed the 
application of this new "repudiation5' claim in the LLC context by a showing of 
anticipatory contract breach. (Id.) 
As a matter of law, common law partnership repudiation of the kind described in 
Gherman did not happen here. There was a significant difference of opinion about the 
factual scope of what was included in the LLC and the members5 respective ownership 
interests. (R. 201 8 at 205-43, 2019 at 244-383, 2020 at 384-490, 2021 at 491-710, 2022 
at 714-813, 2023 at 820-86 & 892-957, 2024 at 995-1112, 2025 at 1134-1245, 2027 at 
1413-1502, 2028 at 1532-44; Exs. Vols. I-IV.) There was no difference of opinion, 
however, regarding the existence of the LLC or the fact that the LLC had customers, 
assets, and liabilities. (R. 1, 5-7, 42-44, 55, 272-301, 1377-78, 1383, 2019 at 271, 274, 
286, 2020 at 406, 423, 2021 at 491, 494-95, 499-500, 2024 at 1096-97, 2027 at 1397-
1400, 2028 at 1511; Exs. 68, 69.) As a matter of law, breach of contract under these 
circumstances does not qualify as Gherman repudiation. 
The legal instruction to the jury on this point was wrong on the law. (R. 1146.) 
Furthermore, the legal motions demonstrating the failure of this necessary element of the 
Gherman claim should have been granted. (R. 1203-07, 1686-89.) But for these errors, a 
judgment could not have entered on a wrongful dissolution verdict. 
The court of appeals justified its departure from Gherman on grounds that Jeaness 
did not require a finding of repudiation like that in Gherman. (Ct. App. Op. |^ 39.) 
Jeaness was &per curiam decision that applied Gherman without analysis: neither party 
argued the point. See Jeaness, passim. The decision nevertheless rested squarely and 
fully on Gherman. See id., 706 P.2d at 145-46. Wanlass cited both decisions, but only in 
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dicta, as it rejected the need for a wrongful dissolution analysis in light of an authorized 
statutory dissolution. See Wanlass, 790 P.2d at 572. The watering down of a legal 
principle through inattention is not the same as the reasoned development of the common 
law. 
As a matter of policy, if the common law is to be applied it should be applied to 
give effect to the wisdom it embodies. The concept of repudiation of the entity is 
premised on a willful act considered transcendent of mere breach and therefore tortious. 
See Gherman, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 340-41, 344-45. That concept has been captured in 
California law by statute. See id. In Utah, there is no such statute. Nor does Utah 
recognize tortious breach of contract as California does. See Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch, 
701 P.2d 795, 798-99 (Utah 1985) (rejecting tortious breach of contract approach of 
Seamans' Direct Buying Serv.} Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 686 P.2d 1158 (Cal. 1984)). 
Thus, if Gherman is to be adopted as a special extra-statutory rule in Utah LLC cases -
the first of its kind in the nation - it should be distinguished from ordinary contract cases 
on the grounds that distinguished it in the first place. 
On review, the court of appeals' decision should be reversed. That decision 
incorrectly affirms erroneous district court legal determinations describing and applying 
the Gherman repudiation element in this case. On both statutory and common law 
grounds, that decision is wrong as a matter of law. Without such determinations, the jury 
verdict cannot stand as entered and the judgment based thereon should be vacated. 
III. The court of appeals erred in procedurally precluding consideration of 
Burningham's claims and defenses. 
For the independent reasons set forth in this Part 111, individually and collectively, 
the Court should reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand for properly 
supervised proceedings. 
A. The lower courts erred in declining to judicially supervise the winding 
up and termination of the LLC following its dissolution. 
Dissolution does not terminate an LLC. See Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-1203. 
Rather, it marks the end-point for the ordinary, day-to-day carrying on of business as 
usual; and it marks the starting point for "winding up" and liquidating the company. 
See id. § 48-2c-1213(2). The LLC Act defines winding up: 
The winding up of a dissolved company is the process consisting of collecting all 
amounts owed to the company, selling or otherwise disposing of the company's 
assets and property, paying or discharging the taxes, debts and liabilities of the 
company or making provision for the payment or discharge, and distributing all 
remaining company assets and property among the members of the company 
according to their interests. There is no fixed time period for completion of 
winding up a dissolved company except that the winding up should be completed 
within a reasonable time under the circumstances. 
Id. § 48-2c-1301. Winding up of necessity requires accounting for all assets and 
liabilities, identifying profits and losses, and determining the status of capital accounts for 
each member. Utah Code Ann. §§ 48-2c-102(3), -903(l)(a), -906, -1003, -1301, -
1308(2). In their pleadings, both members asked for just such an accounting. (R. 15-17, 
58-60, 63, 224, 293-95, 427, 501.) 
The court of appeals erred as a matter of law by declining to require a winding up 
and liquidation of the LLC in accordance with the LLC Act. "After entering the decree 
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of dissolution, the court shall direct the winding up and liquidation of the company's 
business and affairs in accordance with Part 13." Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-1213(2). The 
court of appeals dealt with this law by suggesting the LLC was not dissolved; by 
concluding the obligation was permissive rather than mandatory; and by holding that 
LLC members, not the court, wind up the company. (Ct. App. Op. ^ 23, 28-3 ].) 
The court of appeals' handling of this LLC issue resulted in harmful error to 
Burningham and 1ARC. Specifically, had the court properly overseen an LLC accounting 
in a winding up, Wilson would have been entitled, at best, to a credit to his capital 
account, not a check representing an LLC distribution free of any other obligations. 
Under the LLC Act, a member's capital account reflects, among other things, "the 
member's share of profits, gains, and losses of the company" and "the member's share of 
the net assets of the company upon dissolution and winding up that are distributable to 
the member or the member's assignee." Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-102(3). Applying 
correct legal principles, a determination regarding the scope of the LLC and the amount 
of profits attributable to Wilson does not of itself result in a check being cut to Wilson for 
that amount, as the district court judgment purports to do. 
Distributions to LLC members occur only per the Act. "If the operating 
agreement does not otherwise provide, each current distribution shall be made to all 
members concurrently, or at other times determined by the members in a member-
managed company . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-1002. Moreover, distributions are 
made to members "in connection with the dissolution and winding up of a company . . . 
in accordance with Section 48-2c-1308." Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-1003. 
Here, the court of appeals affirmed the district court's decision not to oversee the 
steps called for by the Act to effectuate a winding up. (Ct. App. Op. T) 22-31.) Until this 
happens, Wilson is not entitled to a $1.2 million return on his $23,500 investment. 
At the time of dissolution, as well as at the time of trial, the LLC still owed the 
bank hundreds of thousands of dollars for the machine it owned. (Ex. 670.) Under the 
Act, moreover, creditors get paid before liquidating distributions are made to members. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-1308. If Burningham's capital contributions were in fact 
''loans55 from 1ARC to OLP, then IARC is entitled to a return of its money with 
appropriate interest before Wilson gets to take profits out of the company. See id; R. 
2029 at 3-4. Moreover, a member owning a greater percentage of the company would 
bear a greater percentage of any losses after expenses. See Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-
1308. 
The lower courts, however, did not apply the law in this way. The result was that 
Wilson was given a judgment representing "profits55 of $1.2 million, while Burntngham 
was saddled with the LLC's bank debt and IARC did not receive any "loaned55 money 
back. This is simply not a correct application of the law. 
The district court specifically deferred winding up after dissolution, then held that 
no winding up would take place - because, it said, the jury's non-statutory wrongful 
dissolution conclusion had obviated the statutory remedy. (R. 1583-87.) This is exactly 
backwards. See Southern Oaks, 732 So.2d at 1160-61 (holding statute obviates extra-
statutory remedy). This Court should correct that error because the court of appeals 
failed to do so. 
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B. Burningham was entitled to an actual accounting of the LLC. 
The district court's pretrial rulings were that legal claims would be tried first, not 
exclusively. (R. 1023.) Yet the court never would go beyond the jury verdict to reach 
Burningham's other claims. The court of appeals failed to correct the error. 
"An 'accounting' is defined as an adjustment of the accounts of the parties and a 
rendering of a judgment for the balance ascertained to be due. An action for an 
accounting usually invokes the equity powers of the court, and the remedy that is most 
frequently resorted to . . . is by way of a suit in equity." Mankert v. Elmatco Prods., Inc., 
854 A.2d 766, 768 (Conn. App. 2004) (citing 1 Am. Jur. 2d 609, Accounts & Accounting 
§ 52 (1994)); see also Privett v. Clendenin, 52 S.W.3d 530, 532 (Ky. 2001) (same). 
It is settled in this jurisdiction that an accounting is performed by the court sitting 
in equity, not a jury sitting as a legal tribunal. See Wanlass v. D Land Title, 790 P.2d 
568, 573 (Utah App. 1990). Preliminary issues regarding the terms of the parties' 
agreement may be determined first by a fact finder; but if they are, the trial consists of the 
bare minimum necessary to perform the accounting. See, e.g., id.; Simpson v. Simpson, 
311 F.2d 770, 770-71 (10th Cir. 1962). Damages are not awarded, and judgment does 
not enter, on a jury verdict. Wanlass, 790 P.2d at 572. Once foundational issues are 
resolved, the accounting proceeds under the direction of the court. See id. 
To render an accounting, either the district court or a designated special master or 
independent CPA undertakes a detailed examination of the business's accounts. Upon 
completion, a report is generated allocating profits and losses, addressing outstanding 
issues, and proposing a plan for liquidation. The parties then have the opportunity to 
object to any discrete portion of the report. The matter is thereafter settled with a final 
accounting as reflected in findings of fact entered by the trial court, which are reviewable 
upon appeal. See Chang v. Soldier Summit Dev., 2003 UT App 415, ^ 4-8, 14-17, 82 
P.3d 203 (describing accounting process and court's review of final accounting). 
Burningham was entitled to the specificity provided by this process, with actual 
and discrete reviewable determinations on accounts, expenses, assets, liabilities, profits, 
losses, capital accounts, and distributions. The district court denied Burningham this 
right. The jury verdict itself, and the judgment entered thereon, are now purported to 
represent the sum total of deliberations on these issues - issues that were not for the jury 
- with no chance for the kind of meaningful review called for by judicial decisions. (R. 
1583-86, 2029 at 14-16; Ct. App. Op. ffl[ 21, 34.) 
The district court's approach to resolving the accounting issues failed to address 
numerous questions inherent in this LLC dispute necessary for a fair resolution of this 
dispute: What are the members' respective capital accounts? What went into them? 
What are the LLC's allocated costs and expenses? What are they for? As to which 
customers? What non-customer expenditures are included? What is the percentage 
allocation to the LLC of lARC's overhead? For what items? How are post-dissolution 
matters accounted for? How does the ultimate accounting differ from the LLC's CPA 
determinations? How should prior LLC tax returns already filed with the taxing 
authorities be amended, if at all? What about unfiled returns? Are Wilson's gaming 
magazines, purchased with an LLC credit card, an allowed expense? (Ex. 362.) How 
can Burningham challenge or defend individual expense items when he doesn't know 
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what they are? What accounting determination would result in a 5000% return on a 
member's investment? 
These questions require an answer under the LLC Act. The winding up provisions 
of the Act contemplate an actual accounting. See Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-1301. These 
questions can only be answered by a court following and applying an established, 
reviewable accounting procedure that was not provided here. This Court should reverse. 
The district court exceeded its discretion here by putting legal claims to the jury 
without ever sorting through these issues. The accounting remedy, if not waived, is for 
the court to consider. See Cheves v. Williams, 1999 UT 86, ^ 33, 993 P.2d 191 
(recognizing accounting general rule but concluding the defendant had waived it); Mills 
v. Gray, 167 P. 358, 359-60 (Utah 1917) (citing general rule); Charlesworth v. Reyns, 
2005 UT App 214, 113 P.3d 1031 (same). In this case, Bumingham never agreed to 
submit the accounting issue to a jury or otherwise waived it. (R. 54, 58-60, 293-95, 883-
85, 1583-84.) Bumingham insisted at all times he be afforded his right to an accounting 
by the court. (R. 303-05, 524-32, 1524-29, 1583-84, 2017 at 43-44.) Bumingham further 
submitted that, once the proper ownership interests were fixed under the LLC statute, and 
once the proper scope of the LLC was resolved, any monies properly allocated and found 
to be due and owing in an actual court-supervised accounting would be received, paid, or 
distributed as required thereby. (R. 327, 374, 2014 at 12.) No such proper determination 
was ever made. 
The court of appeals rejected the need for an accounting in light of the verdict and 
the court's articulated repudiation claim. (Ct. App. Op. ^ 34.) The court concluded that 
repudiation was an exception to the accounting-first requirement under Gherman. (Ct. 
App. Op. TI 34.) Here, where Gherman's elements were not met, that decision is 
reversible. See supra Part II.C. More importantly, Gherman is an exception to the 
accounting-first rule, not an excuse never to render an accounting at all. 
In sum, Burningham is entitled to the LLC accounting both he and Wilson asked 
for when this case was filed. The court of appeals erred in sanctioning a procedure that 
allowed the district court never to reach this issue. 
C. Burningham was deprived of the opportunity to have his purely 
equitable claims and defenses heard. 
Lastly, the court of appeals' decision affirming that the district court need not hold 
promised proceedings deprived Burningham of the chance to have his "purely" equitable 
claims and defenses adjudicated - "equitable" used in this sense to refer to his pleaded 
estoppel and laches defenses. (R. 54.) The district court (1) set up a special procedure in 
these proceedings for handling equitable claims and defenses, (2) ruled that evidence 
would be presented separately to the court and that Burningham need not present all 
evidence at the jury trial, (3) then specifically declined to follow this outlined course. (R. 
1023, 1410-13, 1419-21, 1524-29, 1537, 1551-57, 1578-79, 1583-87, 2014 at 2-5 & 8 & 
11, 2016 at 43-44, 2026 at 1372-73, 2028 at 1508-09, 2029 at 2.) 
After the fact, the court invoked the general rule oiZions First Nat 7 Bank v. 
Rocky Mtn. Irr., Inc., 795 P.2d 658 (Utah 1990), to hold that equitable issues are 
circumscribed by jury determinations where the same operative facts give rise to the 
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claim. (R. 1585.) But the rule in Zions applies only if the same operative facts relate to 
legal and equitable issues. See 795 P.2d at 661-63. 
Here, Burningham's estoppel theory was based on the fact that Wilson had taken 
inconsistent positions on dissolution. (Ct. App. Aplt. Reply Br. at 22.) The facts 
underlying this issue were not tried to the jury. (R. 289, 1104-08, 2018-208.) Moreover, 
Burningham's laches theory was that Wilson had delayed the proceedings to allow a 
greater claim based on the continued operation of the LLC while its fate was 
undetermined, an issue not encompassed within the jury proceedings. (Id.; Ct. App. Aplt. 
Reply Br. at 22; see Sciutti v. Union Pac. Coal Co., 85 P. 1011, 1012 (Utah 1906) 
(holding laches can include delay within an already filed proceeding).) These arguments 
were never heard. Moreover, IARC was never heard on its claim for declaratory relief 
related to funds that Wilson argued were IARC "loans." 
These petitioners are entitled to have the claims and defenses they raised actually 
adjudicated. Where issues are preempted and never decided, a litigant has not had his 
day in court. 
The procedure followed below does not reflect how justice or equity should be 
meted out in the Utah courts. If a claim is to be tried in a particular forum or in a 
particular way, a party is entitled to notice of that fact and the right to present evidence 
and be heard on it. See National Farmers Union Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Thompson, 286 
P.2d 249,253 (Utah 1955). Burningham and IARC were deprived of that opportunity 
here and appeal to this Court for redress. 
Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the court of appeals should be reversed. 
The case should then be remanded for proceedings consistent with a proper application of 
Utah law, including the rights and remedies prescribed by the Utah LLC Act. 
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